TURKEY'S IDEOLOGICAL APPARATUSES AND GLOBALIZATION

Caner Taslaman, Assoc. Prof, Philosophy, Yıldız Teknik University

ABSTRACT

The argument that will be presented here is briefly as follows: the effects of globalization and of the wider use of electronic media – by which I mean especially private television networks and the internet – have led to a decrease in the state centre's control over Turkish society. The state is no longer able to control the information conveyed to society via its ideological apparatuses and no longer enjoys the influence on culture and on forming identities it once possessed. By examining the most important ideological apparatus, that is the state's educational apparatus, and its Department of Religious Affairs, I will try to show how their role in inculcating the state's founding ideology has been diminished. This process, in which the wider use of electronic media plays a significant role, constitutes one of the main reasons behind the increase in the independence and power of the actors, institutions and communities in Islamic circles that were repressed within the framework of Kemalism, the founding ideology of the center. With this increase in power, Islamic circles also began to exert influence on the center, with a resulting dissipation of the ideological differences between the center and the periphery. The ideological diversity of the periphery began to reflect onto the center, with a resulting decrease in Kemalism's power over it. On the other hand, the information and culture transmitted via electronic media, a significant element of globalization, is also paving the way for the transformation of Islamic circles; on the one hand it is providing advantages for Islamic circles and on the other it is bringing about brand new problems.

Key Words: Islam in Turkey, Globalization, Ideological Apparatuses, Althusser, Electronic Media.

Islam in present day Turkey has a non-homogenous structure that has emerged from a multitude of reasons as a result of dynamics arising from globalisation, complex causal processes, a distinctive history, and decisions and actions by actors influential at micro-levels. Understanding this structure is practically like solving a large puzzle; if you exclude any of the dynamics, the big picture you obtain will not be complete. I am aware that it is very difficult to form an understanding that embraces the whole picture; by stating that both micro

enlightenments and macro approaches are necessary and that we are face-to-face with a non-homogenous structure, I actually admit that understanding the whole picture constitutes a superhuman effort. In the following pages, I will try to focus on a part of this puzzle, which, I believe has an outstanding importance in the whole picture. What I will focus on in particular are the changes that have arisen in Islam in Turkey from the wider use of electronic media, an important element of globalization. Globalisation is a process that presents political and cultural, as well as economic aspects. The globalisation of knowledge and culture is what stands out the most in terms of the issues that I will highlight in this article.

THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY AND ITS IDEOLOGICAL APPARATUSES: EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE DEPARTMENT OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS

It was the French philosopher Louis Althusser (1918-1990) who introduced the term "the ideological state apparatuses" into social sciences.[1] It is impossible for a state to shape and guide its individuals as it wishes through its repressive apparatus only, that is to say through its police force, its courts and its prisons. This is where the ideology and the state's ideological apparatuses, which inculcate that ideology, come to the aid of the state. Although there has been an increase in the influence of these tools in the modern era, the importance of inculcating an ideology was understood a long time ago. When Plato stated that in order to be shaped on demand, children need to be educated with "beautiful lies," he actually highlighted the influence of the inculcation of an ideology in the rule of the masses.[2]

In the modern era, as in the rest of the world, in Turkey, too, schools have been the most important tools in the spreading of the state ideology.[3] I would like to emphasise that in the period when I claim that there was a decrease in the influence of the ideological state apparatuses, there was actually an increase in these tools in terms of the number of institutions and of personnel. In the following part of this article I will endeavour to show that in spite of this, the importance of these tools has diminished. From the foundation of the Republic to the present day, there has been a linear increase in the number of educational institutions and of students at all levels, from primary schools to universities.[4] But the increase in urbanisation between the Republic's formation in 1923 and 1950 remained under 1%. In 1950, 75% of the country's population still lived in rural areas.[5] After 1950, there was a linear and rapid

increase in urbanisation and the rate of people living in rural areas dropped to approximately 20%.[6] Urbanisation results in more frequent encounters with the ideological state apparatuses and in being shaped by these to a greater degree. As a result of the increase in urbanisation, the state was able to reach out to wider masses through its ideological apparatuses.[7]

The Department of Religious Affairs is another ideological apparatus of the state that is of importance from the point of view of our subject. The Republican centre demonstrated different approaches to religious institutions: these different approaches may be summarised as suppression of these institutions' power, oversight of their power and their usage as ideological apparatuses. Ideological apparatuses from the previous period which could counter the newly established ideology, such as the Caliphate, were abolished and institutions that had the potential to mobilise the masses against the ideology of the new state – against the new centre – were thus destroyed. How mosques should be kept under control constituted a point of concern; the worry that mosques would fall under the control of religious groups never abated. Through a law passed in 1931, the administration of mosques and prayer rooms and the appointment of staff were transferred to the Department of Religious Foundations. With another law passed in 1950, the administration of mosques and prayer rooms and the appointment of staff were next transferred to the Department of Religious Affairs.[8] In the period up to the 1940s, the tendency to suppress or take under control the power of mosques and *imam*s was stronger than the tendency to use them as ideological apparatus. Another indicator of the above tendency is the fact that in 1927, when the population had reached 13.6 million, the mosque staff affiliated with the Department of Religious Affairs numbered 5,668, while in 1950, when the population had increased tremendously and had reached 20.9 million, the number of mosque staff dropped to 4,503.[9] An increase was later seen in the number of staff affiliated to the Department of Religious Affairs and this number is now over 80,000.[10] The number of mosques, which is around 80,000 in present day Turkey, was 42,744 in 1971 and 47,645 in 1981, but by 1991 this number had risen to 66,674 and by 2001 it reached 75,369.[11] The law affords the management of all mosques and prayer rooms to the Department of Religious Affairs, but because of staff shortage the said Department is only able to assign personnel to 70 % of the mosques. Despite this, it is evident that the control of 70 % of all mosques, almost all of those in big cities, constitutes a significant power. And the management of religious education activities in more than 7,000 Quran courses is also another indicator of the effectiveness of the Department of Religious Affairs.[12]

**THE INCREASE IN THE INFLUENCE OF ELECTRONIC MEDIA**

Both the increase in the number of schools and the data I have provided concerning the Department of Religious Affairs seem to present a picture that opposes my argument that there has been a decrease in the influence of these ideological state apparatuses. In spite of these data, I insist that these and other ideological apparatuses of the state have lost some of their importance. I believe that, in conjunction with other factors that developed within the process of globalisation, the increase in the influence of electronic media on culture and forming identities, and the dissemination of information of these media rank among the major reasons for this phenomenon. The liberalisation of private radios and televisions, and spreading of internet from the 1990s onwards constitute special important turning points. My focus point here consists of the changes that have resulted in Islamic circles as a result of the change in the power of the Republican centre to exercise its influence via its ideological apparatuses. The consequence of mass communication for Turkey was the decrease in the state's ability to change and shape society and Islamic circles, via its ideological apparatuses. There are two major reasons for this:

1-   Global culture – and especially neo-liberal values, which are of great importance in terms of our subject – are changing society via the media and independently from the ideological state apparatuses. The media's increasing role in transmitting information and world views is therefore stealing the role from ideological state apparatuses.

2-   Islamic circles are spreading an alternative ideology via the media corporations they are establishing.

While the family and religious ideological apparatus used to be of higher priority in the shaping of individual identities, as pointed out by Althusser, over time, the educational ideological state apparatus has come to replace the religious ideological state apparatus and family.[13] The increase in the media's influence has resulted in a decrease in the capacity of educational institutions in Turkey – as well as of religious ideological apparatus, Department of Religious Affairs – to shape individuals. Moreover, as pointed out by Herbert Marcuse, it is difficult to compete with the media and its rising importance, and thus it has also resulted in a decrease in the family's influence on individuals. According to Marcuse, the family as a factor of socialisation has lost its previous importance, while mass communication has

risen.[14]

Although radios are not as important as televisions or as the internet, when we look at listening rates for radios, we see that the influence of radio broadcasts on society cannot be underestimated. In a survey conducted by the Radio and Television Supreme Council (*Radyo Televizyon Üst Kurulu* – RTÜK), 59.4 percent of respondents stated that they listened to the radio.[15] The amount of radio broadcasts that radio listeners listen to is 3.41 hours during the week and 3.27 hours during the weekend.

Radio Listening Rates on Weekdays

| Hours	Rate
1 hour or less	26.2
2 hours	27.1
3 hours	14.9
4 hours	7.7
5 hours	6.4
6 hours	3.5
7 hours	1.8
8 hours	4.5
9 hours	0.7
10 hours or more	7.2

Establishing the number of viewing hours for televisions in Turkey will indicate why the state's educational apparatus have become less important in the dissemination of information and in the creation of individual identities and world views, and also why I am emphasising that television is a factor that should be paid great attention to in the process of transmitting information and culture. According to a study that was conducted by RTÜK and that is one of

the most significant in this area, per capita television viewing hours average 4.3 hours on weekdays. On weekends this figure reaches 4.6 hours.[16]

Television Viewing Rates on Weekdays

Viewing time	Rate
1 hour or less	5.9
2 hours	17.2
3 hours	20.5
4 hours	16.4
5 hours	13.7
6 hours	13
7 hours	2.5
8 hours	4.4
9 hours	1.9
10 hours or more	4.5

The introduction of the internet in Turkey occurred much more rapidly than many other technologies, such as televisions, for example. Starting with the 1990s, internet spread rapidly during that decade and the 2000s. While in 1995 the number of daily internet users was around 10-15,000,[17] this figure presently exceeds 20 million. [18]

Main Indicators

	2007 (*)	2008 (*)	2009
Number of households with internet access	19.7	25.4	30
Rate of computer usage among individuals in the age group 16-74	33.4	38	40.1
Rate of internet usage among individuals in the age group 16-74	30.1	35.9	38.1

(*) Results for the years 2007 and 2008 have been revised in line with population projections.

Social networking websites are also drawing great interest in Turkey. As of 1 July 2010, 22,552,540 Turks are users of Facebook, the most famous of these websites. Turkey occupies fourth place after the U.S.A., the United Kingdom and Indonesia.[19](Facebook has reported that in average users spend 55 minutes on Facebook.)[20]According to internet statistics conducted by Comscore in 2009, Turkey occupies 7th place in Europe in terms of internet users. What is of greater interest is that with an average of 32 hours internet usage and 3044 pages viewed, internet users in Turkey spend the highest time on the internet in the whole of Europe. According to Comscore, there are approximately 17 million individual user of the internet in Turkey, but when mass usage as is the case with internet cafes, and internet usage via mobile phones are taken into account, this number exceeds 26 million and is increasing every day.[21]

THE RISE OF "THE INDIVIDUAL AGAINST THE STATE" AND OF "DEMOCRACY AGAINST SECULARISM" DURING GLOBALISATION

When paradoxes arose between "the state and the individual" and between "secularisation and democracy" in the early Republican period, preferences were made for the state and for secularisation and the policies adopted were "for the people in spite of the people."[22] In the West, modernisation, democratisation and secularisation have generally developed as parallel processes and many philosophers have even theorised the process of modernisation as a universal, single-type model. However, in many Islamic countries – including Turkey – the Islamic world view that is inherent in popular culture was repressed via anti-democratic means and the environments brought about by democracy resulted in the strengthening of the religious aspects that are inherent in popular culture. (This is also important in that it reveals the error of universal and single-type modernisation theories.)

In Turkey the process of globalisation resulted in both a spread of global culture and of neo-liberal ideology, which is an important element of global culture. Although the governments led by Turgut Özal and the EU process constituted important factors in the spread of this culture, the role of the media in the dissemination of the new culture in the privacy of homes, through entertainment and without openly declaring that it is teaching something, should not be overlooked. The spread of this new culture has helped the opposite side in the above paradoxes – "individuals against the state" and "democracy against secularisation" – to gain strength. The influence of the new climate arising from the culture and the neo-liberal ideology that spread via globalisation should be taken into consideration when we consider that the process of 28 February – 1997 – resulted in a "stumble," rather than in the "sledgehammer like impact" of the military coups of 1960 and 1980.

THE DECREASE OF IMPORTANCE OF THE EDUCATIONAL IDEOLOGICAL STATE APPARATUS

Because of the factors such as uninterrupted increase in urbanization and improvements of infrastructure all around Turkey; electronic media became easily reachable and started to be used widely. These have thus became mass communication tools listened to/viewed by wide masses. Social and infrastructure changes in society have made these tools increasingly instrumental in the education, enlightenment and entertainment of society. During this time mass communication was privatised and transformed into a tool that presents a wider variety

of programmes. As pointed out by McLuhan, nowadays mass communication tools constitute classrooms without walls, thus threatening classroom education; the amount of information transmitted through these communication tools has exceeded that transmitted through schools.[23] And while radios, televisions and the internet gained importance, there has also been a parallel decrease in the power of those apparatuses that had previously been influential in shaping individuals, in particularly the family and of educational institutions which had represented the state's most important ideological apparatus. The loss in the influencing power of the state's ideological apparatuses should definitely be taken into consideration when analysing Turkey's Islamic circles.

When this important change in mass communication tools merged with other factors, even though educational institutions, the most important ideological apparatus of the state, increased in number, there was a decrease in their power to promote the founding ideology of Kemalism. Other factors that I believe to have been influential next to the media are as follows:

1. Different ideologies, including the Islamic world view, began to be represented within the state centre. The representation of different ideologies in the centre prevents the use of the educational ideological state apparatus to promote the founding Kemalist ideology, as was the case before.

2. There has been an increase in Turkey's face-to-face contact with many parts of the world and especially with the West. The numbers of academics and students going abroad and especially to EU countries and to the US are also on the rise. This increase in contact with foreign countries results in an encounter with a "Western understanding that has not been filtered by Kemalism" and introduces a critical perspective regarding Turkey's official history and founding ideology into educational institutions and especially universities. Phenomena of this kind are among the reasons that prevent educational institutions from spreading the founding ideology as planned.

3. Islamic circles, which have acquired freedom and strength since the 1980s, have dampened the state's power to spread its ideology both by "attaining a position" in the state's ideological apparatuses and by forming their own educational institutions.

All of the above, as well as the influence of the media, are an indication of why after the 1980s the state's educational institutions were not as influential as before in shaping individuals according founding ideology of the Republic, despite the fact that there was an increase in both their numbers and the number of students. This process is of great importance in the analysis of Islamic circles because it resulted in a decrease of the influencing power of

the educational apparatus, the most important ideological apparatus of the Republic's secularisation project.

On the other hand, factors such as the encounter to a major degree with the media and with Western education institutions, that reduce the importance of the above tools, have also created new problems for Islamic circles because of their Westernising, secularising and transforming powers, in a new fashion which are not repressive as before, yet which even seem to be more influential than the preceding tools.

THE DECREASE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS

In order to understand phenomena related to Islam in Turkey it is important to understand the influence of the Department of Religious Affairs and its role in transmitting the state ideology to the people. But in spite of the numerous staff and the means at the disposal of this Department, I claim that the Department of Religious Affairs has lost some of its importance as an ideological apparatus. There are several reasons why the new climate brought about by radios, televisions and the internet has resulted in a decrease of importance for the Department of Religious Affairs, despite the fact that this department is still influential:

1. Hundreds of radio and dozens of television stations belonging to Islamic circles transmit religious information through national and local broadcasts. For example, 39.3% of people who watch religious programmes on television watch the Gülen Community's Samanyolu TV and 23.1% watch Kanal 7.[24] The influencing power of the media tools that enter homes has resulted in a significant decrease in the Department of Religious Affairs' role in transmitting religious information.

2. Besides the broadcasting corporations owned by religious communities, intellectuals from Islamic circles are exercising their influence independently from the Department of Religious Affairs and especially through televisions. Although this department were even reluctant about the religious programmes broadcast by the state-run Turkish Radio and Television (*Türkiye Radyo Televizyon Kurumu* – TRT) before the establishment of private television stations, its role in transmitting religious information has now greatly decreased.[25] Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan's asking the Department of Religious Affairs to "save us from

media preachers" is an indication of the discomfort felt with the transmission of religious information through media that is not under the control of the said department.[26]

3. The number of people who are reached via the ever increasing influence of the media and the length of time within which people are reached is much higher than the number of people attending mosques and the length of time spent in mosques. (Many people perform their prayers at home because of the belief that other than Friday prayers all prayers can be performed at home.) According to a research study conducted in 1996 by the Department of Religious Affairs, midday prayers are performed in mosques by 9.3%, night prayers by 8.6% and Friday prayers, performed once a week and most frequently in mosques, by 39.5% of the population (over 90% of this rate consists of men).[27] If we take into consideration that midday and night prayers last less than half an hour and Friday prayers last between half an hour and one hour; and we compare this period of time with the four hours per day in average that wide masses spend watching television, we can see how brief this time actually is.

4. The amount of time that people spend with staff from the Department of Religious Affairs in mosques and the amount of information transmitted in Turkish is extremely limited. The major source of information is the sermon given on Fridays, a talk that lasts about 15 minutes (and part of which is in Arabic). Sermons are also given in Turkish for people who come early to Friday prayers and to the *tarawih* prayer during Ramadan, but these sermons, that are not sent out by the Department of Religious Affairs, and therefore do not have the same aim as those sent by this department, and that are not addressed to masses that are as numerous as those of Friday prayers, are not that efficient in transmitting the state ideology. Previously, when most people were not literate and influential tools like the electronic media did not exist, sermons were more important as tools of verbal influence. But once people entered the media's influence sphere, literacy increased and both religious and non-religious information began to be read from books and from internet, and listened to through media; sermons lost their importance as tools of verbal influence on society.

5. Both the Department of Religious Affairs and the Foundation of Religious Affairs have websites.[28] Although these are important websites and do attract followers, they can be considered insignificant next to the thousands of religious websites and Facebook pages set up by religious communities and individuals.
   In earlier times the Department of Religious Affairs prepared reports against İslamic groups like the Nurcu movement.[29] After the 1980s, long term single party governments like ANAP and AKP developed a significant base within Islamic circles; because of their base and their ideologies, these parties did not enlist the Department of Religious Affairs to act against

influential Islamic communities. In addition to the support afforded by the attitudes of these parties, the independence of religious communities was also bolstered by the increase in liberal tendencies seen after the 1980s and the fact that other minority parties also did not want not to antagonize these communities, which constituted significant voter potential. As a result, the representation of different ideologies in the centre and a decrease in the tendency to keep civil society under control has resulted/is resulting in the fact that the Department of Religious Affairs is not being used to promote the founding ideology, in the same degree, as it used to.

Some aspects of the Department of Religious Affairs, since the beginning of the Republic, have not undergone any changes. The department is used first of all to prevent movements that may attempt to change the regime via a top-down revolution, and secondly to integrate society via a Durkheimian role. The department can be said to be a successful ideological tool in terms of the realisation of these objectives. On the other hand, if we consider that secularising individual lives and reducing the number of religious references constitutes a significant element of the state's founding ideology, the Department of Religious Affairs cannot be said to serve this purpose. As is the case with other monotheistic religions, the message of Islam shapes individuals' existential world view in line with an ontological and epistemological understanding where religion is above all other world views/philosophies of all kinds. This world view is by nature antithetical to an ideology that aims for the reduction of religious references. It is clear that an institution that states its views on the basis of religious sources, conducts Quran courses, and organises prayers is diametrically opposed to an ideology that aims for the secularisation of society. What we can infer from this state of affairs is that the principles of the founding ideology are based on a hierarchical structure. The ideological principle of top priority – and related to laicism – for the state centre has always been to prevent the state from falling under the control of religion. This has been accomplished by policies such as passing laws that are not based on religious references and using the Department of Religious Affairs to serve this principle. On the other hand, the activity carried out by this institution also aims for the continuation, perpetuation and increase of religious references in people's lives; this means that the secular principle of the founding ideology has been/is being sacrificed.[30]

In short the Department of Religious Affairs is an institution that aims for the Islamisation of the people while it serves the prevention of the Islamisation of the state; while it contributes to the Islamisation of the people, through its interpretations of Islam it also plays an important role in the prevention of "revolutionary Islamic" interpretations similar to the understanding

of Seyyid Kutub. But because of previously mentioned circumstances arising from globalisation there has been a decrease in the importance of this apparatus as well as the educational apparatus of the state. In spite of the relative reduction in its activity, I would however like to emphasise that the Department of Religious Affairs continues to be an important actor in Turkish Islam.

THE NEW ENVIRONMENT FORMED BY THE MEDIA AND ISLAMIC COMMUNITY

As pointed out by Baudrillard, the media have disrupted power relations.[31] I have already mentioned that Islamic circles in Turkey have benefited from the disruption of power relations by the media. On the other hand, some people are concerned that the change caused by the media has spoiled the purity of Islamic identities. In an article written upon such a concern, it is reported that a woman listener of a radio belonging to an Islamic community began her letter with a verse from the Quran, then asked for a love poem, and finally signed off with the pseudonym "Barbie in a *chador*."[32]

McLuhan has drawn attention in particular to television's enormous ability to influence people unconsciously, by atrophying their minds.[33] The criticism of media in contemporary philosophy is a continuation of a criticism that can be dated back to Plato and that draws attention to the deceptive potential of art;[34] while in Ancient Greece the "deception of art" was exercised mostly through poetry and tragedies, nowadays it takes place via the films, series and sitcoms watched on TV. On the other hand, again as pointed out by Plato, it is possible to use art to educate people in a "positive sense," but the meaning of "positive" and "correct" varies from ideology to ideology.

A new phenomenon has arisen related to the privatisation and spread of televisions and the invention and spread of the internet: on the one hand Islamic circles have gained independence from the influencing power of the founding ideology which is considered as the "other," but on the other hand it has encountered new "others." To this end, it has become incredibly easy to encounter "the other in respect to Islam," that is to say New Age religions such as Scientology, Satanism, atheism, porn publications of all kinds and attacks/criticisms directed at Islam. The difficulty of supervising the internet and the ease with which information can be loaded onto the internet at a very low price, if not for free, have transformed the internet into an environment with all kinds of content. With the internet phenomenon, it has become very difficult – if not impossible – for the state centre to control

information as a means of keeping citizens under control and for Islamic groups to control information as a means of keeping followers under control.

We can easily say that before the 1990s the majority of Turkish citizens – especially those in rural areas – knew very little, if not anything at all, about Satanism, New Age religions, or even atheism. But nowadays, because of the ever-growing prevalence of private television stations and the internet within homes, even people living in rural areas are able to find the most detailed information on all views that are considered the "other" by Islam simply by pressing a few buttons. I believe that the inevitability of such encounters will increase the importance of the "philosophy of religion," which is a field of rational questioning of religion, and one of the Islamic fundamental sciences, "*kalam,*" which has the mission of responding to non-Islamic views on the basis of rationality.

On the other hand, it is difficult for religious orders, the majority of which traditionally emphasised segregation and isolation and embraced mysticism, to continue to influence a large part of society unless they undergo a significant transformation. In fact, some influential Islamic groups like the Süleymancılar and the İskender Paşa have chosen to continue their traditional orders, yet they have changed to a great degree in respect to representatives of their tradition from a century ago. Because Nursi didn't choose proceeding a traditional order structure, and promoted the reckoning with opposing views in his books that can be included in the "*kalam*" field – which he prefers to refer as "*tafsir*," or commentaries on the Quran – the Nurcu movement has gained an important advantage in this era where investigating and coming to terms with "the other" views have been rendered inevitable, especially because of the media and the internet. The Gülen community, which follows in Nursi's footsteps, has pursued a strategic understanding that prefers the coming to terms with opposing views to segregation, has used such books – written by Fethullah Gülen – as *Asrın Getirdiği Tereddütler* (Reservations Arising from Our Era),[35] and has directed the media and other institutions it controls for this inevitable reckoning. I believe that this is one of the main reasons why the Gülen community has outpaced other Islamic groups in terms of educational institutions, media corporations and number of followers; this community has pursued the Nursi school of thought which has preferred reckoning rather than segregation and it has developed this understanding via the work it conducts, as well as the institutions it founds and guides.[36]

Private television networks and the internet have not only brought about a decrease in the importance of the ideological state apparatuses and resulted in Islamic circles gaining freedom, they have also become a source of new problems for Islamic circles and they have

created new possibilities for the views of Islamic circles to spread and for the strengthening of ties between members of Islamic groups. Almost all Islamic groups have formed their own websites and are endeavouring to reach out to their target groups.[37] As it is so easy to create a website and open accounts in famous social network sites such as Facebook, not only Islamic groups but also individuals from Islamic circles are able to load information related to Islam onto the internet by themselves or together with other people and to therefore use the internet to discuss Islamic subjects and to persuade people. The internet thus makes it possible for individuals from Islamic circles to become influential without receiving any support from communities with many followers or without having a lot of money at their disposal. This kind of phenomena also causes strentghtening of individualism within İslamic communities which is a threat for authority of İslamic groups.

It is very difficult to predict what kind of a future awaits Islamic circles as a result of the communication technology and of many phenomena related to globalisation, which has brought about both new issues and new opportunities for these circles, but I can easily say that socio-political analyses that do not take into consideration the important role that this new state of affairs will play in the future of Turkey and of Islamic circles in Turkey will be inadequate and unfruitful.

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2 Platon, **Devlet**, 6th Ed., Trans: Selahattin Eyüboğlu and M. Ali Cimcoz, Istanbul, Remzi Kitabevi, 1988, 3rd Book, p 77-107; Louis Althusser, **İdeoloji ve Devletin İdeolojik Aygıtları**, p. 87.

3 Louis Althusser, **İdeoloji ve Devletin İdeolojik Aygıtları**, p. 176-177.

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5 Hüseyin Bal, **Kent Sosyolojisi**, Isparta, Fakülte Kitabevi, 2006, p. 27.

6 TÜİK "Adrese Dayalı Nüfus Kayıt Sistemi: 2010 Yılı Sonuçları", (online) http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=8428

7 Present day rural areas have also undergone significant changes; there has been an important increase in the rate of influence of the rural population through globalisation and in their educational institution attendance rate.

8 Mehmet Görmez, "Türk Hukuk Mevzuatında Dini Kurumların Yeri ve Uygulama", **Avrupa Birliği Sürecinde Dini Kurumlar ve Din Eğitimi**, Ed. İlyas Çelebi, Istanbul, Ensar Neşriyat, 2007, p. 489-490.

9 For the change in number of staff of the Department of Religious Affairs between 1927 and 1950, see: Mehmet Görmez, "Türk Hukuk Mevzuatında Dini Kurumların Yeri ve Uygulama", p 110. For the change in the population between 1927 and 1950, see: Hüseyin Bal, **Kent Sosyolojisi,** Isparta, Fakülte Kitabevi, 2006, p. 77.

10 "Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı "Personel Sayısı", (online) http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/turkish/tanitim/istatistiksel_tablolar/1_personel/1_1_personel_sayis i.xls, 25 July 2010.

11 Ruşen Çakır, İrfan Bozan, **Sivil, Şeffaf ve Demokratik Bir Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Mümkün Mü?,** Istanbul, TESEV Yayınları, 2005, p. 73; Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, "Cami

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12 4,200 of these Quran courses are in provinces and counties, 1,382 in towns and 2,343 in villages: (online)

http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/turkish/tanitim/istatistiksel_tablolar/3_Kuran_kursu/3_1_yerlesim_yerine_gore_Kuran_kursu_sayisi.xls, 15 July 2010.

13 Louis Althusser, **İdeoloji ve Devletin İdeolojik Aygıtları**, p. 176-177.

14 Douglas Kellner, "Kültür Endüstrileri", Trans. and Comp.: Erol Mutlu, **Kitle İletişim Kuramları**, Ankara, Ütopya Kitabevi, 2005, p. 238.

15 The study conducted by RTÜK covered 4,376 people; 2,600 said that they listened to the radio and 1,776 said that they did not: RTÜK, "Radyo Dinleme Eğilimleri Araştırması-2", Ankara, 2009,

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(online) http://www.rtuk.org.tr/sayfalar/DosyaIndir.aspx?icerik_id=0ff756b8-292d-4269-9dbc-2bbfe6782cf0, 17.06.2010, p. 51.

17 Peter Wolcott, Seymour Goodman, "The Internet in Turkey and Pakistan", Stanford, Center for International Security and Cooperation, 2000, (online) http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/11911/turkpakinternet.pdf., p. 28.

18 TÜİK, "2009 Yılı Hanehalkı Bilişim Teknolojileri Kullanım Araştırması Sonuçları", T.C. Başbakanlık Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu, Haber Bülteni, No: 147, (online) http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=4104, 18 August 2009.

19 Nickburcher, "Facebook Usage Statistics by Country", 2 July 2010, (online) http://www.nickburcher.com/2009/12/facebook-usage-statistics-by-country.html. 09.07.2010

20 Facebook "Average User Figures",
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21 Comscore "Turkey Has 7th Largest and Most Engaged Online Audience in Europe", 27 May 2009,
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22 Regarding these paradoxes see: Caner Taslaman, **Küreselleşme Sürecinde Türkiye'de İslam**, İstanbul, İstanbul Yayınevi, 2011, p. 133-137.

23 Marshall McLuhan, "Classroom without Walls", **Explorations in Communication**, 4th Ed., Ed. Edmund Carpenter, Marshall McLuhan, Boston, Beacon Press, 1968, p. 1-3.

24 RTÜK, "Televizyon İzleme Eğilimleri Araştırması -2", p. 108.

25 Tayyar Altıkulaç expressed his unease on this subject in a newspaper interview held in 1989: İsmail Kara, **Cumhuriyet Türkiyesi'nde Bir Mesele Olarak İslam**, 2nd Ed., Istanbul, Dergah Yayınları, 2001, p. 74.

26 **Sabah Newspaper,** "Demokratik Açılımı En İyi Vaizler Anlatır", 4 March 2010.

27 Ruşen Çakır, İrfan Bozan, **Sivil, Şeffaf ve Demokratik Bir Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Mümkün Mü?,** p. 73-74.

28 The most important websites are as follows:
www.diyanet.gov.tr, www.diyanetvakfi.org.tr, www.diyanetvakfi.gov.tr, www.isam.ogr.tr.

29 İsmail Kara, **Cumhuriyet Türkiyesi'nde Bir Mesele Olarak İslam**, p. 152-161.

30 Here I have used the word "laicism" to refer to the excision of any references to religion from the state mechanism, while I have used the term "secularisation" to refer to the distancing of religious references from the daily life of the individual.

31 Steven Best, Douglas Kellner, **Postmodern Teori**, Trans. Mehmet Küçük, İstanbul, Ayrıntı Yayınları, 1998, p. 154.

32 Murat Ural, "Bir Toplumsal Röntgen: Radyo", **Haksöz Dergisi**, No: 73, April 1997.

33 Marshall McLuhan, Bruce R. Powers, **The Global Village**, New York, Oxford University Press, 1989, p. 63-64.

34 Platon, **Devlet**, 10th Book, p 281.-306.

35 Fethullah Gülen, **Asrın Getirdiği Tereddütler 1-4**, Izmir, Nil Yayınları, 1998.

36 Whether the answers provided in this reckoning are successful or not is a subject of philosophical and theological debate and remains outside the scope of this study which focuses on socio-political results.

37 As examples to thousands of websites in this field I can cite the websites of the İskender Paşa Community (www.iskenderpasa.com) of the Süleyman Movement(www.tunahan.org) and of the Gülen Community (tr.fgulen.com). These are the most effective three İslamic groups of which the Gülen community is the distinctly leading one.